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Abstract
Mass surveillance of the population by state agencies and
corporate parties is now a well-known fact. Journalists and
whistle-blowers still lack means to circumvent global spying
for the sake of their investigations. With Spores, we propose
a way for journalists and their sources to plan a posteriori
le exchanges when they physically meet. We leverage on
the multiplication of personal devices per capita to provide
a lightweight, robust and fully anonymous decentralised
le transfer protocol between users. Spores hinges on our
novel concept of e-squads: one’s personal devices, rendered
intelligent by gossip communication protocols, can provide
private and dependable services to their user. People’s e-
squads are federated into a novel onion routing network, able
to withstand the inherent unreliability of personal appliances
while providing reliable routing. Spores’ performances are
competitive, and its privacy properties of the communication
outperform state of the art onion routing strategies.
ACM Reference format:
Daniel Bosk, Ye´rom-David Bromberg, Sonja Buchegger, Adrien
Luxey, and Franc¸ois Taı¨ani. 2016. Spores: Stateless Predictive
Onion Routing for E-Squads. In Proceedings of ACM Conference,
Washington, DC, USA, July 2017 (Conference’17), 15 pages.
DOI: 10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn
1 Introduction
Recent years have been marked by multiple high-prole mass
surveillance scandals, involving a diverse range of players,
from state agencies [31, 34], to large technology rms [6],
through start-ups with close links to academia [6, 27, 32, 54].
In this context, journalists and whistle-blowers must be
extremely careful when sourcing or exchanging sensitive
or damaging information, but they unfortunately still lack
the technical means to fully circumvent corporate and
governmental surveillance eorts. Although data encryption
is oen used as a rst line of defense to protect condential
information, it is unfortunately insucient on its own to
fully protect the parties involved in a remote exchange
of data [17, 20]. Without additional counter-measures,
metadata such as a user’ location and activity can usually still
be tracked, thus revealing what each user shared with whom
and when. e exposure of metadata seriously weakens user
privacy; as famously emphasized by a former NSA and CIA
director: ”We kill people based on metadata.” [37].
Anonymity networks have been proposed to lower the
risk of online spying. ey notably hide the identity of
the client, most oen using mix networks [8] or onion
routing [13, 16]. ese approaches basically mangle user
requests through a series of relay servers, eectively
hiding the link between sender and receiver. To bootstrap
such anonymity networks, relays need to be suciently
numerous, available, distributed over many autonomous
systems, and to provide enough bandwidth. For instance,
Tor [13], the most popular onion routing implementation,
relies on relays maintained by volunteer operators. On
average, 6000 connected relays handle the trac of 2 million
online users1. is small amount of relays relative to the
userbase makes Tor particularly prone to aacks such as
trac analysis [47]. Tor’s infrastructure is also in part
centralised, as 10 Directory Authorities (DAs) compute an
hourly consensus listing online relays and providing means
to contact them. e DAs constitute a single point of
failure, and could be subverted, just like any other relay. We
argue that embracing a peer-to-peer (P2P) strategy—where
any participating user also acts as a relay—would notably
improve onion routing security by drowning malevolent
entities in an ocean of honest peers.
We are not the rst to advocate more decentralisation, as
many aempts at building P2P anonymous data-sharing
networks [10, 15, 18, 35, 43] have been proposed in the
last decades. Typically, such solutions leverage onion
routing with added components to perform e.g. node
discovery in a decentralised fashion. Alas, frequent
dis/connections of participating peers (churn) hinder these
systems’ performances [28], making them unusable in
practice.
1See Tor Metrics at hps://metrics.torproject.org/.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
04
76
6v
1 
 [c
s.D
C]
  2
 Ju
l 2
02
0
In this paper, we propose Spores, a fully decentralised
anonymous le exchange protocol, adapted from traditional
onion routing. To sustain the unavoidable churn, we revisit
P2P by leveraging machine learning in order to predict peers’
availability. Towards this goal, we make two assumptions
on the peers: we consider that each participating device
belongs to a particular user, and that each user owns several
devices (encouraged by the multiplication of appliances per
household [1]). We thus propose the concept of e-squads: an
e-squad is constituted of a single user’s devices, that model
their user’s behaviour by exchanging information through
gossip messaging. Using their user behavioural model, each
device can predict its future state of availability.
We use these estimates to propose a novel onion routing
mechanism, called Probabilistic Onion Routing (Por). With
Por, onion routes may include several candidate relays at
each hop, such that a message can go through the route
as long as one candidate is online per hop. Users employ
the availability prediction to ensure that the routes they
create will remain available with a good probability, without
sacricing their privacy. In addition, Por is stateless—all
routing information is contained in the headers—enabling
short-lived relay servers to pass on messages as soon as they
join the network, eschewing any bootstrap phase.
Building on Por, Spores enables two users to exchange a
le in complete anonymity: rstly, the two users exchange
le metadata and routing information out-of-band (using
another communication channel than Spores); then, using
the routes they agreed upon, their respective e-squads
collaborate to perform the le exchange through Spores,
without revealing their identities to the rest of the network.
e proposed service is quite similar to OnionShare2, without
the security limitations of Tor, and without the need to spawn
a web service prior to the exchange. We say that Spores is
an a posteriori le exchange service.
Our contributions are the following:
• We introduce the concept of e-squads, and build a
intra-e-squad protocol, that allows devices owned by
the same user to create user behavioural models and
thus, to estimate their future availability.
• Based on the e-squad predictions, we introduce
Probabilistic Onion Routing (Por), a onion routing
protocol tailored for networks with high degrees of
churn.
• We use Por to realise Spores, an anonymous le
transfer service. Aer an initial out-of-band exchange
of metadata, two users can privately exchange a le.
e transfer remains ecient despite the network’s
unreliability, and ensures a beer anonymity than
existing onion routing approaches.
2An anonymous le exchange service backed by Tor’s hidden services, see
hps://onionshare.org/.
e remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: we
rst present our protocol and its sub-systems in section 2,
before presenting our aack model and security properties in
section 3. An evaluation of Spores is proposed in section 4.
We make a review of the state of the art in section 5, and
nally conclude the paper in section 6.
2 Our approach
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
Figure 1. e subsystems constituting Spores. From boom
to top: the e-squad overlays (Sec. 2.1) and the global overlay
(2.2) enable Probabilistic Onion Routing (2.3), which lies at
the core of the Spores anonymous le exchange service (2.4).
Spores is constituted of several sub-systems, as depicted in
Fig. 1. At the root of our proposal is predictive routing, which
is made possible by having every peer publish predictions
about their future connectivity. Each peer in the network
is a device owned by an individual, who possesses several
appliances. eir appliances exchange information about
their user through a private e-squad overlay (Sec. 2.1); there
is one private overlay per participating user. Devices use
this information to build a model of their user, and make
predictions about their future availability. is estimate is
regularly published by each device, along with their network
address and public key, on the global overlay (Sec. 2.2). is
overlay enables peer discovery at the scale of the whole
network. Using the above information, any device can
intelligently build Probabilistic Onion Routes (Pors, see
Sec. 2.3), a new kind of onion route featuring several relays
per hop, in order to maximise the route’s availability despite
the relays’ churn. Finally, Sec. 2.4 presents the anonymous
le exchange protocol in itself, Spores, that anonymises a
le transfer through Pors, while making use of each user’s
e-squad for increased dependability.
2.1 e private e-squad overlay
An e-squad overlay is constituted only of devices owned
by the same user. Its role is to make any user-related
information available to the whole set of devices.
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2.1.1 Sharing the user’s behaviour
e e-squad overlay is based on the Sprinkler Gossiper
algorithm [30], extended with acknowledgements [5] to
beer resist churn. As in Sprinkler, we assume each
user owns a set of devices D. e user’s activity is an
ever-growing sequence S = {r1, . . . , ri , . . . } of interactions
ri . Each device d initially only knows about interactions
that took place on it, Sd . rough the e-squad overlay, all
nodes of the e-squad share their local interactions to obtain
S =
⋃
d ∈D Sd . Interactions are timestamped, and totally
ordered.
Contrarily to Sprinkler, an interaction can be either a
device usage event or a le exchange event. A le exchange
is tied to a single device (sender or receiver), and all the
e-squad needs to know what device is involved in which le
exchange. To this end, an interaction r is constituted of the
following elds:
r = (ts,d, typ, f ) ∈ R × D × T × F
such that: ts ∈ R is the interaction timestamp, d ∈ D is the
descriptor (see Sec. 2.2) for the device where the interaction
r took place, T = {USE,DL,UL} is the set of interaction
types (resp. device usage, new le download, or new le
download). When typ = DL (resp. UL), f ∈ F contains
the unique ID of the le that just started downloading (resp.
uploading) on d . When typ = USE, it means that device d
was connected at time ts . Devices issue a USE message when
they are grabbed, and every T seconds while they remain
connected.
2.1.2 Modelling the user’s behaviour
Given the sequence of devices’ usage SU = {r ∈ S, r .typ = USE},
each device needs to compute its own probability Pi (d) of
staying online in the near future, before advertising it.
First of all, using only SU , each device builds an availability
sequence X = X1, . . . ,Xi , . . . , where Xi contains the set of
online devices during the interval [ti , ti+1[ (see Eq. 1). e
observation sequence has a period of T : ∀i, ti+1 = ti + T .
e sequence X can be represented as a 2D sparse matrix of
booleans.
Xi (d) = 1 ⇐⇒ ∃r ∈ SU , r .d = d ∧ ti ≤ r .ts < ti+1. (1)
Now, to predict Pi (d), we consider that the stochastic process
X follows the Markov property: ‘the future only depends on
the present, not on the past’. We use the hypothesis in Eq. 2.
As a result, the probability for d to be online in the near
future only depends on its probability to stay online aer
the current round Xi = x . To estimate this probability, we
simply count3the number of times the current situation x
led to a situation where d was also online (Eq. 3):
Pi (d) = P [Xi+1(d) = 1 | Xi = x , . . . ,X0 = x0]
= P [Xi+1(d) = 1 | Xi = x] (2)
=
{X j ∈ X ,X j = x ∧ X j+1(d) = 1}0≤j<i {X j ∈ X ,X j = x}0≤j<i  (3)
Given the high dimensionality of the state space, it might
happen that x was never seen before, leading to an undened
Pi (d) In such a case, we estimate the probability that d stays
online two turns in a row as fallback.
2.2 e global overlay
To creates Pors, each device needs to know some other online
devices’ descriptors. For a device d , a descriptor contains its
address @d , its public key pkd , and its estimated probability
of remaining online Pi (d). d also knows its own private key
skd , that it uses to decipher messages encrypted with pkd .
Given the decentralised nature of Spores, we cannot rely
on a central registry of online peers as e.g. Tor does. We use
instead a global Random Peer Sampling (RPS) service [23, 51].
Essentially, each node maintains a viewVRPS containing lV
other devices’ descriptors. Every TRPS seconds, the view is
updated as follows: a device d pops the oldest descriptor d ′
from its view, then swaps a predened number of lgossip
elements from VRPS with d ′. Both devices add a fresh
descriptor of themselves to the view exchange. If d ′ was
oine, its descriptor is simply removed from d’s view, with
no further modication toVRPS.
is allows for two things: rstly, each device’s view con-
tains a constantly changing random sample of participating
devices; secondly, stale descriptors get removed from one’s
view aer a bounded time, such thatVRPS mostly contains
online devices’ descriptors.
Given their epidemic nature, RPS services are very
sensitive to Byzantine aacks, where malicious nodes
gossip bad views in order to disrupt the randomness of
the neighbourhood graph. Several proposals overcome this
limitation, sometimes by relying on a trusted third-party [2],
sometimes by computing a reputation of the peers [4, 24]. We
leverage on the laer, so as to remain entirely decentralised.
2.3 Pors: Probabilistic Onion Routes
Legacy Tor primer Onion routing makes connections
between a client (say Alice) and their correspondent (Bob)
go through two or more servers (or relays) before reaching
their destination. With Tor, to create a route, Alice randomly
picks three relays to constitute the path, and incrementally
establishes TLS connections to each of them through the
3Because we work with low-probability events observed with small amounts
of data, there is a possibility that an event never occurs in X . To counter
that, we apply add-one smoothing [46] while computing probabilities. We
le this engineering optimization out of the demonstration for clarity.
3
Message Mi:
Li envelope: Ei
Li addresses: @i Li cipher: Ci
@1
E1
C1
@2
E2
C2
@3
E3
C3
@B
EB
CB
A B
L1 L2 L3Or:
A
L1 L2 L3
Por:
. . .
LB
. . .
. . .
. . .
Figure 2. In Onion Routing (OR), each layerL is constituted
of only one node. In Probabilistic Onion Routing (Por), there
are several candidate nodes that each message can go through
at each layer. e boom part of the plot shows the format
of a Por message, and the message eectively sent by Alice
to relays in L1.
route. Once the route is established, it constitutes a persistent
two-way TCP stream, although the trac is internally
chunked into xed-size messages (or cells). Cells contain
a header and a payload, that are encrypted altogether by
the client several times: once per relay. Upon reception of a
cell from the sender to its destination, each relay deciphers
it using the encryption keys negotiated during the TLS
connection bootstrap. Bob nally receives the message
originally wrien by Alice, and can answer back on the same
pipe. Messages on this direction are incrementally encrypted
by the relays, such that Alice receives Bob’s message hidden
under three layers of encryption. She decrypts it using
the keys that were negotiated with the relays during the
connection establishment.
e anonymizing property stems from the fact that each
hop Li only knows the address of the previous relay Li−1
(that sent the message) and the address of the next Li+1
(determined at the connection’s establishment). Given that
routes contain two or more hops, no intermediary knows
both the sender and the receiver of a message, thus making
the communication anonymous.
Several relays per layer e basic idea of Probabilistic
Onion Routing (Por) is depicted in Fig. 2: each message
sent from Alice to Bob may pass through multiple candidate
nodes at each hop, instead of only one in traditional onion
routing.
In onion routing, when any of the relays becomes
unavailable, the route is broken and a new one needs to be
created. e prime interest of Pors is that they are resilient
to intermediaries churn: we only need one online relay per
layer for the route to function. In practice, when a node from
layer Li has a message to transmit, it tries sending it to each
device in layer Li+1 in random order, until it succeeds or all
aempts fail. In the laer case, the message is dropped.
In contrast to Tor, Pors do not create TLS connections,
which would be inapplicable with several nodes per hop.
Instead, routes are stateless: all routing information is
contained inside an encrypted message.
Por messages Fig. 2 shows the format of Por headers
(along with an example of a full message as sent by Alice in
Fig. 2). A Por messageMi , as received by any member of
Li , is constituted of three parts,Mi = (@i , Ei ,Ci ):
• @i : e addresses of all members of the current layer
Li , used by nodes of Li−1 to forwardMi .
• Ei : An envelope, destined to Li , that will allow them
to decrypt the cipher Ci .
• Ci : A cipher, that can be deciphered by any member of
Li using Ei . It can unravel into another Por message
Mi+1 for the next layer Li+1, or into an application
payload once the message reached its destination.
By geing rid of TLS connections in favour of header-
based routes, Por enables stateless routing: no prior
communication is needed with relays to establish onion
routes, they simply decipher any received message, and
read their header to forward them to the next layer. is is
particularly interesting for short-lived nodes such as seldom
connected personal devices as we target: they can participate
in the system as soon as they join, without any bootstrap
phase. eir disconnection does not mandate a new route
construction.
On the other hand, Pors are connectionless one-way
channels (UDP-like), and the message is not xed in size due
to the lack of re-encryption between each hop. In particular,
Por does not guarantee messages integrity nor order (as each
cell potentially travels through a dierent path). It is the role
of the upper abstraction layer (e.g. our le exchange protocol
Spores) to guarantee reliable & ordered transmission.
Cryptographic primitives e encrypted message Ci
containing the addresses of the next layer needs to be
decipherable by any of the current layer Li ’s members, and
only by them. is cryptographic scheme is coined Broadcast
Encryption (BE) [14]. We derive our encryption process from
Hybrid Encryption [48] (as used in PGP), where a message
M is encrypted into a cipher C using a unique symmetric
key k (e.g. using AES). Each member of the group Li must
be given this key, which is the purpose of the envelope
E. It contains the concatenation of k encrypted with each
member’s public key (using e.g. RSA). Upon reception of a
ciphered message (E,C), a peer aempts to decrypt each
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Algorithm 1 e Broadcast Encrypt/Decrypt algorithms
1: function BE(P,pkL )
2: k ← random symmetric key
3: C ← SE(P,k)
4: E ← {AE(k,pk)}pk ∈pkL
5: return E, C
1: function BD(E,C, sk)
2: for e ∈ E do
3: k ← AD(e, sk)
4: if k , ⊥ then
5: return SD(C,k)
6: return ⊥
Algorithm 2 e Message Encrypt/Decrypt algorithms
1: functionME(P, L)
2: M ← P
3: for L ∈ reverse(L) do
4: M .E,M .C ← BE(M,L.pk)
5: M .@← L.@
6: returnM
1: functionMD(M, sk)
2: return BD(M .E,M .C, sk)
portion of the envelope with its private key, until it succeeds
(and gets k to decrypt C) or fails.
We write down our broadcast encryption/decryption
algorithms in algorithm 1, and its application to our message
cryptography in algorithm 2.
Let C ← SE(P,k) and P ← SD(C,k) be symmetric
primitives for encrypting/decrypting an arbitrary payload
P with key k , such that SD returns ⊥ on decryption failure.
Let C ← AE(P,pk) and P ← AD(C, sk) be asymmetric
ones for encrypting/decrypting a payload P with the public
key pk (resp. secret key sk), such that AD returns ⊥ on
failure.
(E,C) ← BE(P,pkL) — Given a layer L’s public keys
pkL , and an arbitrary payload P to encrypt, BE broadcast
encrypts P by outpuing an envelope E containing a
symmetric key k encrypted with each pk ∈ pkL , and a
ciphertext C containing the payload encrypted with k .
P ← BD(E,C, sk) — Given an envelope E, a ciphertext
C and a secret key sk , BD broadcast decrypts the payload P
into the expected plaintext, or ⊥ if the decryption fails.
In algorithm 2, we writeL.pk andL.@ to refer to a layer’s
nodes’ public keys and addresses. L = {Li }i is an array of
layers. reverse(L) means we iterate on L in reverse order
(starting from the last element).
M ← ME(P, L) — Given a payload P (that can be a Por
message), and an array of layers L, HE recursively encrypts
the output messageM for each L ∈ L starting from the last.
P ← HD(M, sk) — HD aempts to decrypt the message
M using the secret key sk . It either returns a payload P or
⊥ on failure.
Algorithm 3 Receiving a Por message on d
1: on receiveM
2: P ← MD(M, skd )
3: if P = ⊥ then
4: return ⊥ . Decryption failed
5: else if P , Por message then
6: process P . I am the recipient
7: else
8: Forward(P)
1: function Forward(M)
2: for @ ∈ random(M .@) do
3: if send(@,M,Tout) then
4: return > . Success
5: return ⊥ . All layer oine: drop messagge
Forwarding messages We nally display the message
reception and forwarding procedure in algorithm 3, that
runs on any node participating in Spores (we consider a
deviced). Upon reception of a messageM, d rst aempts to
decipher it using its secret key skd . ree cases are possible:
either the decryption fails, which constitutes an error—the
message is dropped; either the output is not a Pormessage, in
which case the message is destined to d ; either d decryption
unraveled another message, in which case d forwards it
to the next layer using Forward function. is procedure
iterates over each address @ inM .@ in random order, and
aempts to send the message to @. e send function called
at line 3 takes three parameters: the recipient’s address,
the message to send, and a timeout duration. Tout is a
conguration parameter, usually below a second. If the send
call succeeds, the message is duly forwarded. If the ‘for’ loop
returns without any successful aempt, all the next layer is
considered oine, and the message is dropped. Note that
it takes #L ×Tout seconds to drop a message when the next
layer is oine.
2.4 Spores: File exchanges through Por
We now have all the building blocks to perform anonymous
le transfers using e-squads. In this section, we rst present
how two users agree upon probabilistic onion routes for their
exchange, including the intelligent selection to maximise
the routes’ availability; nally, we discuss the le exchange
protocol built atop Pors.
Routes creation Fig. 3 depicts the creation process of a
route between our beloved Alice (uploader) and Bob (the
receiver). As already mentioned, this process takes place
out-of-band (on another communication channel such as
Near Field Communication (NFC), LAN, Bluetooth, carrier
pigeon, or else). e initialisation serves two purposes: to
provide Bob with the exchanged le metadata (we come back
to it in the next paragraphs), and to decide upon the Pors
that will be used throughout the transfer.
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Algorithm 4 Route initialisation between device dA uploading le f (on the le) and dB downloading it (on the right).
1: function InitUpload(f ,θ )
Step ¶:
2: f d ← BuildFileDescriptor(f )
3: sq← {r .d, r .d , dA}r ∈S
4: BL4 ← PickLayer(sq,θ ) ∪ {dA}
5: BL3 ← PickLayer(VRPS,θ )
6: BR1 ← [BL3,BL4]
7: send 〈f d,BR1〉 to dB −→ −→ −→ −→
12: on receive 〈FR1〉 ←− ←− ←− ←−
Step ¸:
13: FL1 ← PickLayer(VRPS,θ )
14: FL2 ← PickLayer(VRPS,θ )
15: FR ← [FL1,FL2] ⊕ FR1
16: r ← (Now(),dA,UL, f d .ID)
17: S ← S ∪ {r } . Shared to e-squad
18: Start sending f
7: on receive 〈f d,BR1〉
Step ·:
8: sq← {r .d, r .d , dB }r ∈S
9: FL4 ← PickLayer(sq,θ ) ∪ {dB }
10: FL3 ← PickLayer(VRPS,θ )
11: FR1 ← [FL3,FL4]
12: send 〈FR1〉 to dA
Step ¸:
13: BL1 ← PickLayer(VRPS,θ )
14: BL2 ← PickLayer(VRPS,θ )
15: BR ← [BL1,BL2] ⊕ BR1
16: r ← (Now(),dB ,DL, f d .ID)
17: S ← S ∪ {r } . Shared to e-squad
18: Start receiving f
3
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Figure 3. For Alice to send a le to Bob through Spores,
they need to agree upon two routes: a forward route to send
le chunks, and a backward one to send acknowledgements.
Each user contributes layers to each route, so as to maximise
the diversity of the involved relays.
Since Pors are one-way only, Alice and Bob need to agree
upon two routes: a forward one, form Alice to Bob, that will
carry le chunks, and a backward route, from Bob to Alice,
that will transport Bob’s acknowledgements of the chunks.
Furthermore, to maximize the peer diversity in the route (for
security reasons), both parties compute a portion of each
route. In the rest of the paper, we sele with a number of
layers of #L = 4, which is required to have decent security
properties, while adding more layers would not make routes
signicantly more secure (as agreed upon by most onion
routing approaches).
We now detail the operations depicted in Fig. 3, and
detailed in algorithm 4:
• At ¶, Alice’s sending device dA cras the inner
part of the header for the route to herself, BR1, at
lines 3-6. e nal layer BL4 is only constituted of
Alice’s devices: dA picks candidates from her e-squad
sequence S (line 3), and lastly adds its own descriptor
to BL4 (l. 4). e third layer BL3 is selected using
dA’s RPS viewVRPS, which contains a pool of global
descriptors. On line 7, dA sends BR1 to Bob, along
with the le metadata f d .
• At ·, Bob’s receiving device dB builds its half of the
forward route (FR1) just like dA did at¶, see lines 8-
11. Again, FL4 is only made of Bob’s e-squad, while
FL3 samples devices from the global overlay. dB
sends FR1 back to dA on line 12.
• Finally, at ¸, both devices bootstrapping before
starting the le exchange. ey rst nish the route
they will use to reach the other end (lines 13-15),
then inform their e-squad that they started sharing
a le by adding an interaction r to their sequence S
(lines 16-17), and nally start exchanging f (line 18).
Relays selection We now detail the PickLayer(V,θ )
function, that takes care of intelligently selecting a layer’s
devices. It takes two parameters: an input set of candidate
nodes V , and the unavailability threshold θ ∈ ]0, 1],
a conguration parameter that represents the desired
maximum probability that all of the layer’s nodes fall oine
at the same time (i.e. the probability that the layer be
unavailable).
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PickLayer iteratively picks a random node from V
without replacement, adds it to the output layer L, and
computes the probability that all of the layer’s nodes fall
oine at once, PoL :
PoL =
∏
d ∈L
1 − Pi (d) (4)
Pi (d) being the probability that device d remains online
(cf. Eq. 2). e function returns either when the oine
probability PoL falls below the threshold θ , or when the input
view V is emptied. As a baseline that will be used in the
evaluation, PickLayer randomly chooses a predetermined
number of nodes from the input view, without caring for the
layer’s probability of becoming unavailable.
Non-e-squad layers are built with VRPS as input: it
comprises a random pool of global Spores participants that
were online not long ago at least (cf. Sec. 2.2). e RPS
view size lV should be chosen big enough for PickLayer to
reach the congured θ , but small enough that the view’s stale
descriptors get evicted in a reasonable amount of time. E-
squad layers, on the other hand (that is, FL4 andBL4), only
have the less numerous e-squad members as input, such that
PickLayer might not be able to reach the threshold before
emptying the candidate list.
e smaller the threshold θ , the more nodes per layer, the
beer the route’s availability, but also the bigger the header.
ere is a trade-o between the readiness of routes and the
message transit overhead.
Finally note that randomly picking descriptor from
one’s view avoids biasing the relay selection in favour of
supposedly highly connected nodes. Indeed, the devices’
availability estimate is published by themselves, and should
not be trusted. Our approach gives no interest for aackers
to lie on this value, while it encourages everyone to provide
good estimates, for the sake of the routes’ reliability.
Exchanging a le As already told, Por provides anony-
mous UDP-like channels: order and integrity of the messages
are not guaranteed by the protocol. ese features must be
supplied by Spores on top of Por.
A le f exchanged through Spores is chunked into xed-
size pieces, that are transmied in order by the sender, along
with their position (or ID). To ensure chunks integrity, we
borrow from BitTorrent [11]: the le descriptor f d that is
computed with BuildFileDescriptor(f ) and provided to
the receiver on bootstrap notably contains a SHA1 hash per
chunk. e receiver veries that the expected and computed
hashes match every time they receive a chunk. e function
creates the following descriptor:
f d = (ID, size, chunkSize, #Chunks, chunksHash, hash)
Each le is given a unique, random ID, picked by the uploader.
e le descriptor also provides the le size, number of
chunks and chunk size. e chunksHash is the concatenation
of each chunk’s SHA1 hash, used by the receiver to verify the
integrity of each chunk. Finally, hash is the SHA1 hash of
chunksHash, to verify its own integrity. Using SHA1 hashes,
we ensure the le integrity. e order is guaranteed by the
following sliding-window protocol.
To accelerate the le exchange, Spores implements the
Selective Repeat Automatic Repeat-reest (ARQ) [29, 39,
53] algorithm, a sliding-window protocol that lets the sender
send several chunks at once, and allows the receiver to accept
them out of order. e sender provides the chunk ID of each
piece sent on the forward route, while the receiver sends
back an acknowledgement (ACK) with the same ID for each
received piece, using the backward route. When the sender
does not receive an ACK aer sending a chunk, it retries
sending aer a timeout of several seconds. e le exchange
completes once each le chunk has been ACKed.
Finally, as can be seen in lines 4 and 9 of algorithm 4, any
e-squad member can receive chunks/ACKs in spite of the
proper message recipient. When they do, they can unravel
the payload, and forward it to its proper recipient, by nding
the recipient’s address in their e-squad sequence S . If the
receiver is currently oine, they forward the message to
any online e-squad member, until the recipient comes back
online and is able to nally receive the message. In essence,
the whole e-squad acts as a cache for received messages
while the actual recipient is oine.
With these building blocks, we have proposed an entirely
decentralised anonymous le exchange service for e-squads.
It is specically tailored for networks with high churn, and,
thanks to its gossip components, it can scale to a theoretically
unbounded number of users. We now analyse the security
properties of Spores, before evaluating its prototype.
3 Security analysis
We claim that using Spores for exchanging les is more
anonymous than using traditional onion routing (e.g.
OnionShare on Tor [13]). To this aim, we statistically
compare Spores’ and Tor’s resilience to de-anonymisation
aacks.
3.1 Assumptions and threat model
We take interest in an aacker owning a portion of the
network relays (at the very least, their e-squad), and that can
tamper with the protocol’s specication (they can notably
break the random selection while forwarding messages in
alg. 3). eir goal is to link two le exchange participants.
We do not consider the infamous Global Passive Adversary
(GPA) aack model, where an aacker listens on all
communication pipes. Using people’s devices drastically
increases the number of Autonomous Systems (AS) involved
in the protocol (mobile carriers, household connections…),
rendering the GPA unlikely. In any case, GPA circumvention
almost always involves generation of cover trac [15, 40, 41,
50], which we cannot aord on constrained user end-devices.
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Because we leverage secure peer sampling [24], we assume
that the global overlay cannot be tampered with, and does
return a uniform sample of online peers in the system.
Although headers are of variable size, we further assume
that relays cannot guess their position on a route, as they do
not know the number of relays per layer.
We already stated that the number of online relays in Tor
(∼6000) was small relative to the number of connected users
(∼2 million). Spores seeks to involve each user device as
a relay. Hence, we make the assumption that the number
NSp of relays in Spores is a multiple of those of Tor: NSp =
C × NTor, with C ≥ 1. We further assume that there are
Nadv colluding devices trying to de-anonymise Alice and
Bob as they exchange a le. We write pSp = Nadv/NSp the
proportion in aackers in Spores, and pTor = Nadv/NTor
the one in Tor. Finally, we consider #L = 3 hops per route
(excluding the nal layer composed only of the recipient’s
e-squad), and we assume a constant amount of SL relays per
layer.
3.2 Likelihood of the trac correlation attack
It is well established that onion routing and Tor in particular
are not resilient to end-to-end trac correlation aacks [13,
25, 44, 47]. An aacker listening to each end of an onion
route (by owning both end relays or observing trac) can
easily link sender and receiver, and thus de-anonymise the
connection. In Spores, due to the several relays per hop, all
messages do not follow the same path. Considering also the
increased number of relays in Spores, we claim that trac
correlation aacks are more dicult than in Tor.
We do not model the operation of the trac correlation
aack. Instead, we study the probability that an adversary
successfully positions themself on a route’s rst and last
hops, and receives transmied messages on both ends. We
call this overall probability P [analyse mess.].
In Tor, the probability of having an adversary observe the
same message on the rst and last hops—knowing that they
own these relays—is 1, since messages all go through the
same relays once the route is built. In other words, the
probability of seizing messages in Tor, PTor [analyse mess.],
is simply the probability that the adversary successfully
positions themself on the rst and last hop. We assume that
the probability PTor [pick adv.] of selecting an adversary is
the same for each layer (an overestimation of Tor’s actual
security), and that relays are selected with replacement
(which eases the computation, while only having a negligible
impact on the outcome). Under these terms:
PTor [analyse mess.] = PTor [pick adv.]2 =
(
Nadv
NTor
)2
In Spores, it gets more complex. On the rst and last layers,
the situation is the same: the adversary has to own a number
k of relays in the layer of size SL ; then, the previous layer has
to forward the message to the adversarial nodes. We consider
both cases to have the same independent probability:
PSp [adv. reads mess. ∈ L] =
SL∑
k=1
PSp [k adv. ∈ L]×
PSp [adv. reads mess. ∈ L | k adv. ∈ L]
Applying the standard equation for sampling with replace-
ment, and considering a uniform probability of picking an
adversary when they are k among SL , we obtain:
PSp [adv. reads mess. ∈ L] =
SL∑
k=1
(
SL
k
)
pkSp (1 − pSp)SL−k ×
k
SL
= pSp
M∑
j=0
(
M
j
)
p jSp (1 − pSp)M−j = pSp (pSp + (1 − pSp))M = pSp
=⇒ PSp [analyse mess.] = PSp [adv. reads mess. ∈ L]2 = p2Sp
We see that, in Spores, the lesser security of selecting more
nodes per layer (thus augmenting the probability to pick an
adversary per hop) is strictly compensated by the probability
to send a message to the adversaries. e probability that
an adversary reads a message on a layer is equivalent to the
probability of picking an adversary.
Comparing the approaches We see that Spores’ proba-
bility of of trac analysis is beer than Tor’s as long as C is
superior to one (that is, as long as there are more relays in
Spores than in Tor):
PSp [analyse mess.] < PTor [analyse mess.]
⇐⇒
(
Nadv
C × NTor
)2
<
(
Nadv
NTor
)2
⇐⇒ C > 1
Since Spores is specically tailored to enable low-end client
devices to participate in the network, which would increase
the number of relays in the network, deploying probabilistic
onion routes on a legacy network like Tor would indeed
improve security.
3.3 Likelihood of having adversaries on each hop
Tor does not take much interest in the probability that adver-
saries own all relays on a circuit (trivially de-anonymising
the route), as it is negligible with regards to to the
probability that they perform trac correlation aacks. Still,
because Spores selects several nodes per layer, and because
adversaries could break the random selection of relays while
forwarding messages (and intently pick their accomplices
in the next layer until destination), this aack vector needs
to be studied in our case. We note this aack’s probability
P [∀i, adv ∈ Li ].
In Tor’s case, still considering that each layer’s probability
of picking an adversary is independent and equal, the
probability that adversaries own the whole route is simply:
PTor [∀i, adv ∈ Li ] = (pTor)#L .
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Spores’ case is again more complex. e adversary must
rst receive a message on the rst layer L1, i.e. with a
probability of PSp [adv. reads mess. ∈ L] = pSp. en, they
must own at least one relay on each of the next layers L2
and L3, which for each layer has the probability:
PSp [adv ∈ L] = 1 − PSp [adv < L] = 1 − (1 − pSp)SL
==
q=1−pSp
(1 − q) ×
SL−1∑
k=0
qk = pSp ×
SL−1∑
k=0
(1 − pSp)k
e probability that the adversary owns relays on each layers
and successfully forwards it from source to destination is
then:
PSp [∀i, adv ∈ Li ] = PSp [adv. reads mess. ∈ L1] × PSp [adv ∈ L]2
= p3Sp ×
(SL−1∑
k=0
(1 − pSp)k
)2
Comparing the approaches If we overrate (1 − pSp)k ≈ 1,
we get the following inequality:
PSp [∀i, adv ∈ Li ] < PTor [∀i, adv ∈ Li ]
≈
(
Nadv
C × NTor
)3
× S2L <
(
Nadv
NTor
)3
=⇒ C > SL2/3
Considering that increasing the layer size SL past a certain
threshold yields no performance gain (see section 4.2.3), and
is costly in terms of message size and transmission time,
we recommend values strictly inferior to SL = 20. With
this upper bound, C = 7.4. We do expect a deployment
of Spores, with the same userbase as Tor, to reach a much
bigger number of relays than 7.8 × NTor = 46800.
In this section, we have seen that Spores’ churn-resilient
onion routing approach—the multi-path Pors—was not
detrimental to its security under the two aack scenarii that
we covered. In fact, assuming a bigger amount of relays than
in Tor (i.e. assuming that Tor implements Pors), probabilistic
onion routing even yields a security improvement.
4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate Spores in terms of privacy and
performance, depending on the user behaviour, and compar-
ing to existing proposals. We rst describe our evaluation
protocol, before presenting our results in section 4.2.
4.1 Testbed
Let us rst present how we simulated user behaviours, before
going through our experimental setup.
4.1.1 User behavioural models
To the best of our knowledge, there exists no dataset that we
could use to represent the behaviour of an e-squad owner.
For this reason, we propose several models for simulating
users, with the objective of generating devices’ connection
and disconnection paerns encompassing the complexity of
human behaviour.
We employ a discrete-time Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
of order one [42] to represent a user going to dierent places
(hidden process), and their device usage paerns depending
on their location (observable processes). We thus assume
that users switch location with a xed period of T seconds,
and that their next location only depends on the previous
one (the Markovian hypothesis). Each device is modelled by
a independent process: their availability only depends on
the user’s location (and not on other devices). e concept of
availability encapsulates both the power state and transient
connectivity of devices.
An example To illustrate our model, we display a ctitious
user model comprising Nloc = 3 dierent locations and
Ndev = 4 devices. Below are represented the Nloc × Nloc
matrix A, that drives the user’s movements, and the Nloc ×
Ndev matrix B, that is the concatenation of each device’s
probability at each state (i.e. nothing sums to one). Note that
nothing prevents the user from using several devices at a
time (B’s rows do not sum to one):
A =

Home Outside W ork
Home 0.6 0.4 0
Outside 0.2 0.6 0.2
Work 0 0.4 0.6

B =

Phone Laptop Home computer W orkstat ion
Home 0.8 0.6 0.7 0
Outside 0.6 0.2 0 0
Work 0.7 0.2 0 0.7

Once a model is built, we perform a random walk of L
rounds to generate a sequence, or timeline, of interactions
X ∈ {0, 1}Ndev×L . Like in section 2.1.2, Xi (d) = 1 means
that device d was online at round i , and equals 0 otherwise.
Devices, through the e-squad overlay, learn the timelineX to
predict their future availability, but not the hidden location
sequence of their user.
Diverse usermodels With this HMM ground, we can build
models with variable mean availability and predictability.
Consider, for instance, a model with only one location, with
every device’s probability equal to 0.5. Intuitively, this model
is the most unpredictable we could build, as all devices switch
state with uniform probability. On the contrary, a model with
L locations that are visited in order by the user, and devices
probabilities that are either 1 or 0, is very predictable: the
device connection timeline is deterministic, and loops every
L usage rounds.
To build matrices A and B that display such diversity,
we sample their content using the beta distribution, a
versatile probability distribution function dened on [0, 1],
rst studied by Pearson in 1895 [38]. e matrix A is then
normalized as needs be. e beta distribution has two shape
parameters (α , β) ∈ R+∗; we are interested in the function’s
smoothed binomial shape when both parameters are below
9
one. Small values of α = β lead to samples closer to 0 or 1,
while α = β = 1 is the uniform distribution. We skew the
distribution, for a xed β = 0.6, by varying the expected
value µ by picking α = βµ−1−1 .
We measure the predictability of a given model by
generating a timeline X of length L. To evaluate the
predictability, we rst compute the probability Pi (d) that
each device d stays online, for each round Xi such that
Linit < i < L. (Since computing Pi (d) requires initial
information, we only compute it for steps past a number
of rounds Linit.) en, we compare Pi (d) with the actual
outcome Xi+1(d) using a logarithmic scoring rule, that is:
sci (d) = Xi+1(d)loд(Pi (d)) + (1 − Xi+1(d))loд(1 − Pi (d)).
Finally, the total predictability of a model is the average
of all computed log scores.
We proposed 4 user behavioural models representing
diverse predictabilities. For each of them, unless otherwise
noted, we set Nloc = 4 locations and Ndev = 6 devices. Linit is
always set to 50, while the total sequence length L depends
on the experiment duration:
1. Uniform (Uni.): Nloc = 1; each device’s probability is
equal to µ. is model shows no periodicity, and is
thus the least predictable.
2. Unpredictable (Unpred.): as above, the HMM matrices
are sampled from a beta distribution, this time
with β = 0.8, generating transitions and device
probabilities closer to 0 or 1.
3. Predictable (Pred.): here, β = 0.2, which brings
probabilities even closer to 0 or 1.
4. Deterministic (Det.): the user cycles deterministically
through the set of Nloc locations. Devices probability
being always 0 or 1, the timeline X is entirely
deterministic.
We evaluate the performance of Spores with regard to
these dierent models in section 4.2.1.
4.1.2 Methodology
To evaluate Spores, we built a prototype in 6100 lines of Go,
including all core functions except the cryptography. e
users’ behaviours, driving the devices churn, were simulated
with 1600 lines of Python. Each device runs as a Docker
container, participating in a single virtual network. Due
to the scale of the experiment, and to generate somewhat
realistic network trac, each user’s devices are scaered
over a multi-host Docker Swarm. e experiments were
deployed on 6 AWS ‘r5.large’ VMs, plus another one to
orchestrate the experiments.
e experimental process is the following: we initialise
the experiment by leing each user’s device spawn on a
random VM. At this time, booted devices start exchanging
descriptors in the global overlay. Once every device is started,
we start scheduling each device according to their user’s
behavioural model, updating their availability state every T
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Figure 4. On top: File transfer median completion times
for each user model, per mean availability µ. Error bars
represent the interquartile range. On the boom: e
predictability of each user model per mean availability.
Higher is beer, as this is a log score.
seconds. We then pick two random online devices belonging
to dierent users, and perform the initial route creation
through REST calls to each of them. We repeat the operation
until we consider enough les were exchanged, leaving a
reasonable time between exchanges to avoid saturating the
network. We tear down the network and retrieve results
aer leaving some time for the devices to proceed with their
le exchanges. Note that the orchestrating VM is not able
to assess whether les nished exchanging, such that some
les fail downloading for lack of time.
Parameters ere are NU = 25 users in the system, each
running 6 devices, resulting in a network of 150 relays,
randomly scaered over the hosts. Users switch between
Nloc = 4 states.
We xed the le size to 50MiB, and the chunk size to
512KiB, resulting in 100 chunks per le transfer. To bootstrap
the e-squad overlay, we provide them with an initial user
activity sequence of Linit = 50 device usages. is way, even
the initial availability predictions are backed by a reasonably
accurate model.
Each user interaction lasts T = 6 seconds; we leave 5 ∗
T = 30s between each le exchange; exchange 50 les per
experiment, and tear down the experiment 20 ∗T = 2m aer
the last transfer started.
Unless otherwise noted, the unavailability threshold θ for
creating routes equals 0.001. When the user model is not
specied, the unpredictable is under study. When the mean
availability µ is not specied, it equals 50%.
10
4.2 Conducted experiments
We evaluated our system on three dierent regards: its
performance under dierent conditions, its security against
colluding aackers, and nally the dynamics of Pors.
4.2.1 Inuence of the users’ behaviour
We rst study the inuence of the user models and mean
availability of devices on the le transfer performances.
Towards this goal, we perform an experiment per model
described in section 4.1.1 and per µ ∈ [0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9]. On
gure 4, we display the le transfers median completion
times for each of these experiments, along with the
predictability of each model. e top error bars represent
the interquartile range (that is the range between the 25th
and 75th percentiles of the completion time distribution).
Empty error bars mean that no le exchange succeeded (at
µ = 30%, all models fail except the unpredictable (Unpred.)
one). Because the le transfer is handled by devices that
suer from churn just as their fellow peers, the transfer
times should not be taken literally: they merely serve as a
metric to compare outcomes.
We see that the deterministic model stands out in terms of
predictability, while the other models follow a similar paern
with their predictability being minimal at µ = 50%. ey
are still ordered as was predicted in sec. 4.1.1. Consequently,
the deterministic model always shows beer le exchange
completion times than the other models. Most importantly,
it is the only model where transfers are entirely completed
when devices are only available 30% of the time. We also
see that the inuence of the user model decreases as the
network get more available: it is more interesting to perform
predictive routing when the risk of dropping messages is
big.
4.2.2 Security measurements
Using the logs from the Unpred. model with µ = 50%, we now
study the occurrence of the aacks presented in section 3.
Depending on the proportion of colluding users aacking
the system, we display on top of gure 5 the percentage of
routes that were corrupted—either on each hop, as discussed
in section 3.3, or only on the rst and last hops, as seen
in sec. 3.2. e boom of the gure reads the amount of
seized messages once routes are compromised, showing how
Spores circumvents trac analysis aacks. We only showed
results for a single experiment/mean availability couple,
because the probability of such aacks does not depend
on either parameter (the output curves were mostly equal).
All these statistics were computed as follows: knowing
that there are NU = 25 users in each experiment, there are
always 23 potential adversaries per le exchange (excluding
the sender and receiver). We consider a number NUadv ∈[[1, · · · , 17]] of evil users, conspiring to de-anonymise the
whole network. For each value of NUadv, we computed up to
a thousand combinations of conniving users, and counted
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Figure 5. On top: Proportion of compromised routes as a
function of the percentage of colluding adversaries over the
whole network, for both aack types. We see that as long
as the percentage of colluding aackers remains low (which
is likely to be the case in our context), only few routes are
corrupted. On the boom: Proportion of messages observed
by the aacker on each end of the route, considering only
routes that were compromised.
the number of times they successfully compromised a route,
for each route that was created during the experiment. Note
that, doing so, we consider that aackers follow the same
churn model as other users.
For the top of gure 5, we counted the number of times
the set of aackers successfully positioned themselves on a
route, normalised by the total number of routes created in
the experiment. We ploed two curves for the case where
an aacker is on the whole route, and when they are only
on the route’s ends. e boom of the gure displays the
proportion of messages eectively observed by both ends of
a compromised route while aackers perform an end-to-end
trac correlation aack. To compute this statistics, for each
compromised route, we counted the number of messages
that passed through the adversarial relays, normalised by
the total number of messages passing through this route.
We rstly see that it suces to own around 40% of
the network for all created routes to be compromised.
3.6% of the routes would be entirely compromised by an
aacker owning 4.3% of the nodes. Although daunting, this
observation constitutes a major argument in favour of the
multiplication of relays in any onion network. To resist such
de-anonymisation aempts, it us crucial for onion networks
to let any participating device partake in the routing.
Where Spores stands out, in terms of security, is on its
resilience to trac analysis aacks: even when an aacker
successfully positions themself on both ends of the route,
they can hardly observe 15% of trac, even if they subverted
most of the network. Given that most existing end-to-end
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Figure 6. Success rate of the messages transit depending on
the unavailability threshold θ . With θ = 1, Spores behaves
like traditional onion routing with one node per layer.
trac correlation aacks assume that the eavesdropper sees
all the trac, the multi-path routing severely hampers this
aack vector.
4.2.3 Tuning Probabilistic Onion Routes
We have performed a last experiment using the Unpred.
model with µ = 0.5, where we varied the unavailability
threshold θ used by the PickLayer route selection function.
We took θ = {1, .1, .01, .001, .0001}, and exchanged 50 les,
resulting in 10 les per value of θ . Remember that, when
θ = 1, the PickLayer function is satised as long as the
layer’s probability of being oine (PoL ) is lower than 1, that
is, when there is one device per layer. At θ = 1, the resulting
route will resemble traditional onion routing.
To assess the inuence of θ , we counted the number
of messages that successfully traversed their Por for each
parameter value, resulting in the message transit success
rates displayed on gure 6. Given the high churn of the
experiment, traditional onion routes (θ = 1) only allowed
9.2% of their trac to go through. We see that adding
any number of devices per layer allows to reach 75% of
reliability at least. e most reliable route occurs when
θ = .0.1, where 91% of the messages go through. Adding
more devices per layer only weakens the route despite the
added redundancy: this is explained by the bigger network
cost (due to the increased header size) and latency (due to
the sequential aempts at reaching the next layer’s relays)
of adding alternatives. It is interesting to note that, as θ
shrinks exponentially, the number of relays per layer seems
to grow linearly: it is 2.5 for θ = 0.1, 4, when θ = 0.01, 6
when θ = 0.001, and 8 when θ = 0.0001.
We see that multi-path routing is a very promising
prospect for onion routing over an unreliable network,
and that a reasonable threshold is enough to provide
maximum route eciency. e header size linearly grows
(per increments of a symmetric block size) per the number
of relays per hop, while the added cryptographic cost of
deciphering a handful of envelopes per hop is minimal. We
hope to improve on our header format in future works to
make Pors even more powerful, via the use of Sphinx [12]
to enable more compact and secure header formats.
5 Related works
Anonymous le sharing between people is not an easy
problem, for technical and political reasons [21, 33]. In
2014, OnionShare (hps://onionshare.org) solved the issue
by proposing a solution over Tor: one of the two persons
(the ‘server’) willing to exchange a le creates an onion
service over Tor [13], and provides the other person (the
‘client’) with an onion link (a random hash URL nishing
with ‘.onion’) pointing to the service. e client then
visits that site through the Tor browser, and can either
download from or upload to the server (depending on the
conguration mode). Once the transfer is completed, the
server tears down the service, leaving no further trace of
the le exchange. OnionShare requires that the server be
created prior to the le exchange, while Spores requires
no such bootstrap, simplifying the exchange. Furthermore,
OnionShare leverages Tor, consequently it is inherently
susceptible to a variety of trac analysis aacks [7, 36, 45].
A variety of proposals aempt to circumvent the aacks by
enhancing the route selection process [3, 49, 52]. Our work,
orthogonal to these, takes another approach: we promote
a multiplication of relays while being churn tolerant to
eectively improve anonymity. Supporting the same claim,
HORNET [9] proposes a new onion routing strategy aiming
beer performance and resistance to mass surveillance
programs by rendering relays stateless. However, Spores is
still more resilient to the aforementioned aacks, though,
thanks to our multi-path routing approach.
Some academic proposals, such as Tarzan [15], Vu-
vuzela [50] or Loopix [40] do tackle also trac analysis,
and even the Global Passive Adversary (GPA) model where
an aacker would listen on all communication pipes. All of
them achieve this feat by generating dummy cover trac,
which we consider undesirable due to the important footprint
of such approach, when we target mobile appliances with
constrained resources.
We take the most interest in eorts to decentralise
anonymity networks, which would allow them to scale and
be more resilient. I2P, being more than a decade years old,
has to be cited as a fully P2P anonymity system, comprising
34k daily users [22]. Although, the lack of coverage of its
security properties does not allow to compare it to other
systems. Recent prospects to allow decentralisation of
networks take interest in leveraging blockchain technologies,
or trusted computer zones, to realise critical building blocks
of decentralised systems. NextLeap [19], for instance, oers
to solve the problem of identifying peers using blockchain
technologies. SGX-Tor [26] proposes to make onion relays
more secure by running them in encrypted enclaves;
and ConsenSGX suggests that Tor’s centralised Directory
Authorities consensus could scale to more relay servers
12
using the same components. Spores does not need trusted
computing to warrant its security properties. Although,
blockchains or trusted enclaves would be an interesting
avenue for future developments in user authentication, for
instance.
6 Conclusion
With Spores, we have proposed an anonymous P2P le
transfer protocol by revisiting traditional onion routing and
leveraging on the people’s own devices. Overall, we have
seen that Spores was a sound approach to onion routing
in challenging network conditions. rough its predictive
component, it can successfully accomplish le transfers even
in the worst connectivity scenarii. Its security properties
are novel, as it is one of the rst onion routing approach to
nally hinder trac correlation aacks. Its design makes
it t for large scale deployments on commodity hardware,
which would lower the risk of de-anonymised routes. Finally,
the multi-path routing approach proves its worth when
compared to the legacy on an unstable network: the fact
of proposing just one alternative node per layer already
increases the routes’ reliability by 65%.
In future works, we hope to improve on Spores on several
aspects. Our predictive model could be enhanced; it would
rstly require some eld studies about people’s usage of their
e-squads. We also look upon contributions like Sphinx [12]
to have more compact and secure header formats.
13
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